Abstract: Kosovo has been under various forms of international administration since 1999.
forces in Kosovo. Meanwhile, more than 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians were either forcibly expelled from their homes or decided to flee the conflict, representing some 90 per cent of the estimated Kosovar Albanian population in 1998. The level of infrastructural and institutional destruction in Kosovo added to the political wrangling over the final status of the territory and continuing inter-community tensions, and provided the United Nations and leading Western governments with a perfect legitimate excuse to preclude any immediate transfer of authority to indigenous authorities and to authorize an international administration that would regulate all aspects of the everyday life of Kosovars (Lemay-Hébert, 2011b and . Hence, the Security Council mandated UNMIK to administer 'temporarily' the territory of Kosovo, in the process conferring on the UN administration executive, legislative and judicial powers over the territory.
More than sixteen years after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1244 establishing UNMIK, the UN is still de jure administrating Kosovo, even if it jump-started the process of should be an ambitious policy of transfer of authority to the institutions of Kosovo, coupled with a restructuring of UNMIK (UN, 2004: 3-5) . As Ambassador Eide further noted in a second report, 'while standards implementation in Kosovo has been uneven, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political process' (UN, 2005) . Hence, it was clear that 'after administering Kosovo for six years and four months, the UN accepted that its usefulness had come to an end' (King and Mason, 2006: vii) . Martti Ahtisaari, appointed Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status, built extensively on Eide's assessment and in 2007, after fruitless negotiations between Serbian and Kosovar representatives, recommended 'independence, supervised by the international community' for Kosovo (UN, 2007) . Hence, as Tim Judah states, 'the years of the UN protectorate looked as though they were giving way to those of something new: an EU protectorate, at least in those areas where Albanians lived ' (2008: 116) .
Many authors have explored the political hurdles of governing Kosovo through an international administration (Caplan, 2005; Hehir, 2009; Lemay-Hébert, 2011a and Narten 2008; Visoka, 2011; Yannis, 2004) . Most of these analyses fall into the wider frame of the critique of the liberal peace paradigm as the dominant form of externally supported peacebuilding (Chandler, 2006; Cooper, 2007; Duffield, 2007; Joshi et al. 2014; Richmond, 2005) . The liberal peace refers here to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than 'illiberal' states. Hence, liberal peacebuilding implies not just managing instability between states -the traditional focus of the IR discipline -but also building peace within states on the basis of liberal democracy and market economics (Newman et al., 2009: 7) . The liberal peace encompasses socio-cultural norms associated with peacemaking, as well as the international and national structures instrumental to promoting the liberal peace. Economic considerations are also central to the model, for liberal peacebuilding implies 'the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance -liberal market democracy -from the core to the periphery of the international system' (Paris, 2002: 638;  see also Duffield, 2001; Pugh et al., 2008) .
While keeping in mind the aforementioned legitimacy gap, this article analyses certain oftneglected economic themes in the statebuilding and peacebuilding literature, all related to the international governance of Kosovo in the first decade following the 1999 war, and hints at an alternative research agenda. While there has been much critical debate about liberal peacebuilding in the last decade, leading to innovative conceptualizations of the limits of the external imposition of political institutions on so-called fragile or weak states (Grimm et al., 2014) , critical scholars have recently been challenged to develop 'sharper theoretical tools to understand and explain the complex empirical cases that are thrown up by the liberal peace' (Heathershaw, 2013: 275; see also Zaum, 2012) . This article tries to contribute to this new wave of theorization by explicitly drawing from rentier state theory in economics and the impact of external inflows, exploring 'the patterns of development and the nature of states in economies dominated by external rent' (Mahdavy, 1970: 428 Lemay-Hébert, 2015) . Without engaging in the debate surrounding the corruption of international officials 5 -which can be enlightening when discussing culturalist claims that the 'culture of 3 Substantial external inflows can also include worker remittances from abroad -something that is not strictly 'rent', but can have similar consequences, as discussed below. 4 A concept also developed by Florian Kühn (2010) . 5 The most serious cases of misconduct in Kosovo were: the embezzlement of € 3.9 million of Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) funds by Joe Trutschler, a senior German official, and € 300,000 by Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) Division Manager, Roger Reynolds; and allegations of corruption by Gerard Fischer, who was the Deputy SRSG and signed a contract involving Post and Telecom Kosovo (PTK) without going through procurement procedures. Mr Fischer has been arrested but has not faced trial, and has accepted another assignment. Recently, an internal report was leaked, revealing that the European Union and United Nations have abandoned investigations into serious allegations of fraud and corruption over £ 60 million-worth of funding for Kosovo. According to this report, EU funds for economic reconstruction Kosovo' impedes any significant changes in the region (Aitala, 2008; Cilluffo and Salmoiraghi, 1999) 6 -this article looks at the limits of economic management 'from the outside-in' (LemayHébert, 2009b) . It revisits Kosovo's economic growth data in the post-war years, and looks at the difficulties we face in assessing Kosovo's post-war economic growth. Finally, the article analyses the impact of international transfers on the local economy through the specific lens of the rentier state and the 'Dutch disease' theory, shedding additional light on the complex interplay between the economic and political dimensions of international statebuilding.
Liberal Peacebuilding and the Rentier State
It is now commonly accepted that contemporary attempts at statebuilding avowedly or inadvertently deploy policies akin to the 'liberal peace' paradigm (see Joshi et al., 2014) . Despite the common idea, the liberal peace paradigm is here not so much associated with classical liberal thinking -which is actually a heterogeneous and diverse scholarship -but instead has closer links with the democratic peace theory in international relations. 7 The democratic peace theory posits the absence of major armed conflict between economically interdependent and democratic nations who share membership of common international organizations (Gleditsch, 2008) . The central mechanism behind the theory is that states that share common values, and/or are mutually interdependent, eschew the strategy of war to settle their differences. Different strands of the democratic peace theory have emerged over time, each having an impact on the liberal peace debate. They include studies on the obsolescence of major wars following a normative evolution of mental habits (Mueller, 1988) , institutional perspectives, studying the impact of international institutions on the behaviour of states (Russett and Oneal, 2001) , and economic theses based on cost-benefit analyses of conflict (Oneal and Russett, 1999) . The liberal peacebuilding paradigm is then inspired by these discussions, and in a sense furthers the research agenda to extend it to societal cohesion inside state units. Hence, liberal peacebuilding implies not just managing instability between states -which is the central focus of the democratic peace theory -but also to help rebuild a war-shattered Kosovo ten years ago were hit by at least eleven scandals involving twelve cases of alleged criminal activity and twenty-seven examples of alleged breaches of rules on the award of contracts and nepotism (Buzhala 2006; Waterfield 2009; Zaremba 2007b) . 6 For a non-ideological and culturally sensitive take on Kosovo's 'shadow economy', see the work of Michael Pugh (2004) . 7 Which renders the whole argument of how 'liberal' the liberal peace is rather moot. For proponents of this argument, see Selby (2013 Angell, 1910) . The democratic peace theory was clearly inspired by these discussions, and developed its own statistical models to verify these claims. Hegre (2000) argued that economic interdependence reinforces peace, but mainly between more developed economies, while Russett and Oneal (2001) asserted that it is the economic dependence on trade of the least dependent on the other members of a group of nations that will determine the pacific effect of trade. Among the most recent updates proposed for the democratic peace theory is the 'capitalist' peace notion of Gartzke (2007) , which goes beyond trade dependence. He argues that the intensity of trade is the least important feature in the peace engendered by capitalism; in fact, the nature of advanced capitalism makes territorial disputes -which are mainly contests over resources -less likely as the market mechanism allows easier access to resources. The nature of capitalist production makes the output of more sophisticated goods and services increasingly reliant on ideas or blueprints that are research-and-development oriented rather than resource intensive, and skilled personnel can be acquired through more open global labour markets. Moreover, financial interdependence makes war between those integrated in this manner even more costly compared to trade disruptions.
While building (consciously or unconsciously) on this scholarship, liberal peacebuilding shifts the focus from interstate collaboration to intrastate cohesion. Hence, here the liberal peace refers to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful in their domestic dispute resolution compared to 'illiberal' states. Economic stagnation, or economic development that is very unevenly distributed, can cause the tolerant niceties of an existing domestic social contract to fray. Those left behind and the underprivileged may revolt if coherently organized and if opportunities present themselves, which can lead to internal conflicts and violence. Equally, the relatively rich may choose to prey on the less fortunate if they are no longer prepared to subsidize or support these groups. It is important to note that socalled liberal democracies are not immune from these tendencies; recent history has shown that they can very well behave violently towards segments of their societies. Indeed, as has been argued, since 1991 developing countries are mostly characterized by imperfect democracies or anocracies 8 containing elements of democracy (multi-party electoral competition) along with some of the more invidious traits of autocracy (no effective checks on the executive, for example). Ultimately, as the argument goes, growth and increased economic interaction through globalization, as well as rising democratization, are likely to promote peace between and within developing countries, mirroring Lipset's (1960) modernization hypothesis that democracy (and peace) inevitably follow economic growth.
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Proponents of liberal statebuilding aim to follow a path similar to that described by Auty and Gelb (2001) as 'benevolent and developmental', by which they mean that the state actively promotes an internationally competitive economy, discouraging in the process rent-seeking behaviour. This path, however, is directly challenged when the elite composition of the state and the nature of the economy have characteristics and tendencies that turn the state into a rentier or predatory one. 10 A rentier state derives a substantial portion of its income from nonproduced sources (Omeje, 2008: 5) , and is largely dependent on these external rents and inflows. By 'non-produced income', we refer to categories of income such as official development assistance and worker remittances from abroad that augment national income but are not part of domestically produced output. Worker remittances from abroad are not strictly 'rent', but can have similar negative consequences on domestic production by providing alternative sources of income based on external inflows. We may add the windfall or Ricardian quasi-rent (shortage value) of unusually high natural-resource-related royalties (usually oil) during commodity price booms. Thus, 'rents' can originate from various sources: natural resources (in petro-monarchies, for instance), contrived rent or political manipulation of prices The ideal-typical rentier state is therefore usually associated with weak public institutions, political instability, inequitable wealth distribution 12 , and high levels of corruption, as well as resource inflows from abroad (Woolcock et al., 2001: 76) . This configuration impacts not only the local economy, but also the nature of state-society relations and institutions. 13 External resources can drive a certain type of exogenous growth, but this comes with a vulnerability to external shocks -for instance, the progressive drawdown of international transfers. In a rentierstate context, national income contains a substantial proportion of non-produced elements:
natural-resource revenues or royalties (which are chiefly a gift of nature); foreign aid (in the main, a transfer of resources); and remittances sent by nationals working abroad (whose value added is to a foreign economy). All three elements can seriously 'distort' the structure and future growth trajectory of the economy, via a phenomenon known as the Dutch disease (see Murshed, 2010) . The Dutch disease encompasses a variety of negative impacts on an economy, giving rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency. It describes situations in which consumption relative to investment is encouraged, where production is skewed away from traded goods (agriculture or manufacturing) towards services, 14 and in which exports are rendered uncompetitive. The original Dutch disease is traditionally linked to the real appreciation of a national currency in a context of resource wealth, which undermines the competitiveness of all produced economic activities (i.e. excluding services) (Dauderstädt, 2006: 16) . Dutch disease effects may also emanate from substantial external assistance or worker remittances from abroad. The term was coined by The Economist in 1977 to describe the adverse impact of a North Sea gas bonanza on the economy of the Netherlands, and in this context it involves commodity exports driving up the value of the currency, making other parts of the economy less competitive, leading to a current-account surplus and even greater dependence on naturalresource exports. Later on, the economic theory of the Dutch disease focused on the negative impact of resource booms and external inflows on the long-term growth prospects of the economy (Murshed, 2010) .
Worker remittances from abroad account for a substantial portion of Kosovo's GDP, as indicated in Table 1 . Remittances sent by foreign workers are not strictly speaking a rent, unlike aid or certain types of natural-resource-based royalties. Yet they have been argued to reduce long-term growth in a cross-country econometric study by Barajas et al. (2009) . Worker remittances do permit consumption smoothing, and help reduce poverty in poorer countries, but they can discourage labour supply and prevent channelizing savings into productive investment in countries with poor institutional settings. Moreover, remittances also cause real exchangerate appreciation, but that effect may be weaker than with resource rents (Ratha, 2013) . Ratha also argues that remittances may also encourage private expenditure on health and education, 14 A high share of services in the national income may be characteristic of a mature manufacturing economy. Here we refer to a high share of services as a result of windfall external inflows.
besides helping to reduce poverty in poor countries. Driffield and Jones (2013) find that remittances may promote long-term economic growth in a cross-section of countries, but in a setting of good-quality institutions, particularly law and order (property rights and contract enforcement). Hence, the presence or absence of negative Dutch disease-type effects of substantial remittance inflows may depend on the quality of institutions related to the political economy. The cross-country econometric study conducted by Abdih et al. (2008) suggests that remittances do have a negative impact on institutional quality, as they allow governments to siphon money away for their own purposes, leading to weaker institutional quality in terms of corruption, government effectiveness and the rule of law. Scholars have also questioned the sustainability of the Kosovar economic model relying too heavily on remittances (Korovilas, 2010) , even if this has probably helped mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 (Pula, 2014) , especially helping to keep consumption poverty down.
In the words of Michael Dauderstädt, one of the negative political-economy effects of the Dutch disease can be that 'the government is not really interested in developing the national economy as a tax base because of the availability of rents ' (2006: 16) . By contrast, low rents are more likely to motivate governments to create wealth as the most practical means of boosting output, which can then be taxed to increase revenue (Auty, 2006: 38) . In other words, low rents could align the incentives of the elite with those of the majority in growing the economy by providing public goods and efficiency incentives, whereas high rents incentivize the elite to pursue immediate self-enrichment by channelling rent through patronage networks at the expense of markets, which distorts the economy (Auty, 2010) .
In many ways, the 'rentier state' theory is the political economy counterpart of the purely economic Dutch disease theory, emphasizing the role of institutions (or governance) in promoting or retarding economic progress (see Mavrotas et al., 2011; Mehlum et al., 2006) . In this sense, both the rentier state and the Dutch disease theories provide a counterpoint to the two classical assumptions of the democratic peace theory and the liberal peacebuilding paradigm (normative and economic, as discussed earlier). In this literature, abundant resource rents only constitute a problem for the economy if economic and political institutions are weak, leading to poor governance and corruption. Furthermore, in the context of economies characterized by an abundance of natural-resource rents the combination of Dutch disease and a rentier economy contributes to what has been dubbed the 'resource curse': economic stagnation and political discontent in the midst of plentiful resource rents, which are subjected to elite capture. A predatory state goes one step further (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013: 509-11) : here, the elite's interest in rent extraction renders them into something akin to the roving bandits described by Olson (1996) . A roving bandit merely exacts tribute, without nurturing the tax base from which the rent is exacted, effectively destroying the economy. By contrast, a stationary bandit attempts to expand the very same base by promoting growth, although he is still interested in exacting tribute. The appearance of a high volume of resource rents and substantial quantities of overseas aid can encourage predation. Rentier or predatory states invalidate most of the liberal peacebuilding postulates, since the structure of rentier economies has an adverse impact on the political and economic institutions necessary for sustaining democratization and a competitive economy, which run counter to the interests of elites in a rentier state, and more so in an even more extractive, kleptocratic predatory state.
Hence, we suggest the concept of rentier statebuilding to encapsulate these socio-economic dynamics. We concur with Barnett Rubin's statement that there are definite 'similarities between rentier states based on natural resource extraction and states being built through third-party aid in international operations ' (2006: 30-1) . A large international presence can disrupt market efficiency and have unintended consequences on the social contract binding the government and its population. The large international presence creates negative externalities -defined as a situation in which an individual or firm (in this context, the peacebuilding operation) makes a decision, but does not bear the full cost of the decision, leading to market inefficiencies.
Furthermore, while external aid is vital to reconstruction and development efforts in post-conflict economies characterized by the paucity of private sources of finance, aid dependence may retard the development of state capacity and the development of the national economy as a tax base, as described in Ghani and Lockhart in the case of Afghanistan (2008; see also Kühn, 2008; Rubin, 1992; Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013) . accepted that Kosovo's estimated GDP had grown by at least a factor of two over the nine-year period. However, the key word here is "estimated". (Knaus 2006: 219) . Even if one accepts the international economic data, and while keeping in mind that economic data on Kosovo before the conflict were to some extent as scant and unreliable as after it (del Castillo, 2008: 138) , Kosovo is still far from its per capita GDP levels before the economic crisis of the 1980s, and the disastrous decade of the 1990s (Moalla-Fretini et al., 2005: 6; Palairet, 2001 ).
Breaking the
This should be kept in mind when considering in retrospect the triumphant press releases of the early years of the international administration. This reflects what a former UNMIK official termed the mission's greatest flaw: its propensity to 'spin information to make it appear that the situation in Kosovo is "under control" when this is not the case' (O'Neill, 2002: 108; see also Hehir, 2007: 137) . In fact, the UN in Kosovo has gone further than simply spinning the story; a confidential study conducted for the German government by the Institute for European Politics and leaked to the media accuses NATO and the UN of creating a culture of systematic repression of critical reports in order to present Kosovo as a success story (Pancevski, 2007) . This propensity to silence contradictory voices emerged from the very beginning of the international administration in Kosovo.
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In this context, the development challenges of nascent Kosovo were -and to a certain extent still are -daunting, despite the aid that flowed into the territory after 1999. 16 (Wittkowsky, 2006: 204) . As unrealistic as it may seem, according to its own former officials UNMIK only managed to forge its strategy in 2003, a fact that hindered 'UNMIK's ability to forge a viable peace in a reasonable time frame', which in turn contributed to 'the lack of support for UNMIK by Kosovo's Serb community and the slow erosion of support among the Albanian population' (Blair et al., 2005: 206) . The inability to develop an initial reconstruction strategy was compounded by the European Union's limited experience in post-conflict economic reconstruction and difficulty in finding adequate personnel for these tasks (Yannis, 2003: 180) .
However disputed the economic growth figures under UNMIK, what is certain is that economic policies were clearly not pro-poor and developmental, following in that sense the basics of the rentier state theory. According to the IMF: 'The gains achieved so far not only are fragile but have left major developmental challenges largely unaddressed. These include entrenched high structural unemployment, a depleted stock of human capital, and dilapidated main public utilities 15 For instance, the UN attempted to shut down a Kosovo Serb radio station on the grounds that it refused to air UN messages promoting participation in Kosovar elections. UN sources also mentioned that the station was referring to the international presence as an occupying force (Reuters, 2000) . 16 More than € 3.5 billion in international investment has come from international organizations, bilateral aid and international NGOs (Skendaj, 2014: 13 Moreover, its effects are felt most acutely by children, the elderly, female-headed households and ethnic minorities (World Bank, 2005: iii) . For King and Mason, the unemployment crisis in
Kosovo was linked to the limits of the liberal peace model promoted by the international community: people in Kosovo 'needed more than a free market to find work; they needed employers, and these the international community could not create without reverting to socialist models ' (2006: 89) .
The Importance of Transfers for Kosovo's Economy: Rentier Theory and Dutch Disease
Even if we take at face value the statistics produced on Kosovo under the international administration, the so-called 'economic expansion' of post-war Kosovo described earlier depended overwhelmingly on transfers, specifically diaspora remittances and international While keeping in mind the caveats outlined earlier on the politicized nature of the production of statistics in Kosovo, Table 1 (2013) indicates that the tax-to-GDP ratio in Kosovo of about 22 per cent was very favourable compared to neighbouring states, but with a very high reliance on trade taxes (and very low income tax collection), which will need to be relaxed after trade liberalization, making alternative sources of revenue more important. It is also important to factor in the adoption of the euro, which makes competitive devaluation impossible, despite the low-wage nature of the Kosovar economy. The biggest single factor contributing to the Dutch disease is the economy's major reliance on emigration, and emigrant remittances: one in four households had at least one family member residing abroad, and would-be entrants to the labour market had an expectation to emigrate (World Bank, 2010) .
If the distortions created by the sudden inflow of aid and international workers in Kosovo at the height of international intervention in Kosovo (between 1999 and 2004, as discussed in the introduction) have been considered massive by scholars and practitioners, the absence of reliable economic information once again makes it hard to identify precisely the rent-seeking practices.
Many different accounts reflect the same image of post-war Kosovo, with many Kosovars flocking to Pristina 'looking for work or "investment opportunities"', trebling Pristina's population in three years (King and Mason, 2006: 132 Perritt, 2004: 276) , either by being directly employed by the international institutions or through the informal economy generated by their presence. Mr Bajrami, head of the Chamber of Commerce, explains for instance that it pays better to sell chewing gum to UN staff than to toil in the fields (Zaremba, 2007a) , while a cleaning lady working for the UN in Pristina earns three to four times more than a government minister (Ammitzboell, 2007: 76-7) . A Kosovar judge could earn $5,000 a year in 2004 sitting with an international judge earning $140,000 (Villmoare, 2004: 38) . Not only did the employment of local staff by international agencies create a salary disparity with other local public and private enterprises -with locals working with the international organizations earning four to five times more than their local colleagues who stayed within local institutions (Skendaj 2014: 15) -but it also led to growing tensions between local and international staff working for the same organization. Hence, from the very beginning, 'wages paid by the international community as a whole created wage distortions that put serious pressure on budgetary decisions ' (del Castillo, 2008: 151) . It created a 'bubble economy', where the influx of thousands of international employees provided a huge boost to the service economy -restaurants, bars and bootleg-CD sellers (King and Mason, 2006: 131) , all consequences of external aid inflows and the presence of aid and reconstruction workers. 17 The substantially different salary scales between internationals and locals were responsible for serious inflationary effects, especially on food and the real-estate market (Yannis, 2003: 178) . The latter in particular suffered -with inflation induced by internationals flooding the territory providing opportunities for some, but a housing problem for many (King and Mason, 2006: 132) . These major developmental challenges were exacerbated by the way international aid was invested. As to the base … that base has been made by two or three countries' (Cunha, 2008 ; see also Melkert, 2007; World Bank, 2011: 196) .
A World Bank report (2010) indicates a number of other constraints on economic growth in Kosovo, including energy shortages, a very high skilled-labour premium compared to neighbouring countries, and corruption and weak rule of law related to widespread rent-seeking.
In this context, the solution according to the World Bank is to do more to attract export-oriented foreign direct investment. This opinion is supported by the fact that Kosovo's economy has a large and structural trade deficit, which is a classic Dutch disease outcome (see Table 1 ). What is certain is that, with the level of foreign assistance dropping consistently, Kosovo seems ill- per cent of GDP (UNDP, 2012: 20) . In the absence of a competitive export sector, the economy is still highly reliant upon the inflow of remittances (Korovilas, 2002) .
There is a general consensus that the main productive sectors that can feasibly be expanded are agriculture and the mining and metals sectors. As James Pettifer notes, subsistence agriculture has always been a cornerstone of Kosovo's economy, and it is imperative that agriculture is revived as soon as possible to restore local food supplies, to help restore some elements of social stability, and to reduce Kosovo's dependence on foreign aid (2002: 10). However, Kosovo's agricultural model, attuned to the needs of subsistence agriculture by the extended family, conflicts with the neoliberal model, attuned to the free market and promoted by international actors such as the European Union. 18 The same could be said of the unsatisfactory performance of Kosovo's mining and metals sector, which is largely the consequence of the dominance of the neo-liberal policy paradigm promoted by international actors (Uberti, 2014b) . Finally, the international architecture set up after 1999 cannot be completely detached from Kosovo's socioeconomic system, deeply marked by the extractive industry since 1945 and the rent-seeking behaviour attached to it (Pettifer, 2002; Uberti, 2014a) .
Conclusion
Drawing insights from the economics and political economy of rentier theory, this article has highlighted certain structural limits of contemporary statebuilding operations by focusing on UNMIK in Kosovo. Understanding the interplay between economic and political reconstruction appears key in the context of Kosovo. In the absence of clear improvements in living standards and given the fact that UNMIK was in charge of Kosovo, the population logically attributed all setbacks to the UN administration. This article developed this theme by taking a fresh look at Kosovo's economic growth data, with a specific focus on the socio-economic shortcomings that hindered Kosovo's development in the post-war years. The post-conflict statebuilding project in Kosovo is inspired by the liberal peace paradigm, but this model as a modus operandi for statebuilding is not without its internal contradictions. Rentier statebuilding is one of these contradictions, where the end result is a state less accountable to its people, and less interested in or able to develop an internationally competitive productive base. The former phenomenon refers to the political economy aspect of rentierism, while the latter aspect pertains to an economic malaise (the Dutch disease) where the relative abundance of non-produced income from external flows crowds out production in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, as well as agricultural and manufactured goods exports.
In the case of Kosovo, the combined contribution of resource rents, aid and worker remittances from abroad have amounted to a third of national income. In the past, Kosovo has been able to extract a substantial geopolitical rent in the form of aid. Although the proportion of non-produced income is still very high, in recent years most of this is attributable to remittances received from Kosovars living abroad. However, Kosovo is not a classic oil-dependent rentier economy either, and aid flows are diminishing. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Kosovar state has not failed to harness resources through tax revenues. As indicated above, its domestic tax base is not insignificant, although heavily reliant on trade taxes, which will certainly diminish as the economy becomes more integrated via trade agreements with the rest of Europe.
Critics of aid (Easterly, 2006: 30; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Surkhe et al., 2005) factor in many externalities -positive and negative -associated with international involvement in peacebuilding. Their view is that, on balance, aid does harm as solutions are imposed from the outside, are not sui generis, and can even retard statebuilding buttressed on the mobilization of domestic resources. In this context, our aim here is not to belittle the achievements of the international community in Kosovo (which are numerous), but rather to shed light on the oftneglected theme of negative externalities of international interventions, which can take the form of rentier statebuilding in specific instances. The scholars who include aspects of political economy in their research focus generally on the need to design inclusive socio-economic policies to create the conditions for sustainable development in individual societies, without giving as much importance to possible negative externalities of international interventions on the local economy (Uberti et al., 2014) . At the same time, traditional development economics (see, for instance, Sachs, 2005) has long considered foreign aid as a tool to 'tackle multiple socioeconomic pathologies quickly and simultaneously' (Abuzeid, 2009: 17) , overlooking the potentially deleterious effects on the governments of the receiving countries. In that respect, rentier theory brings an additional level of complexity to the statebuilding and peacebuilding field, asserting that 'it matters whether a state relies on taxes from extractive industries, agricultural production, foreign aid, remittances, or international borrowing because these different sources of revenues … have a powerful (and quite different) impact on the state's institutional development' (Karl, 1997: 34) . Hence, it seems impossible -or implausible -to conceptually separate institution-building from its social moorings (Lemay-Hébert, 2009a ).
Critics of the liberal model are not confined to those who emphasize the negative impact of aid, or those who believe in giving war a chance following Tilly (1992; Luttwak, 1999) , but also involve scholars who suggest a thorough re-examination of this model and of the alternative frameworks of peace. In this context, we agree with Michael Pugh that there is a distinct need to re-politicize economic issues in peacebuilding contexts (2005: 33) . It is our hope that this study will contribute to the broader research agenda on the interplay between economic development and political settlement in peacebuilding contexts, which has started to attract more attention in the last few years (see, for instance, Berdal and Zaum, 2012; Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, 2013; Del Castillo, 2008; Pugh, 2005; Pugh et al., 2008) . 
